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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code § 78A-4-103.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
APPELLEE'S ISSUE NO. 1 (See Appellant's Issue No. 1): Did the district court grant
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis that Defendant Brighton Title failed to
comply with Rule 7(c)(3)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? "The proper interpretation of
a rule of procedure is a question of law, and we review the trial court's decision for correctness."
Kotter v. Kotter, 206 P.3d 633, | 9 (Utah.App., 2009) 2009 UT App 60; In re A.M., 208 P.3d
1058, f 9 (Utah Ct. App. 2009), 2009 UT App 118; Ostler v. Buhler, 989 P.2d 1073, f 5 (Utah
1999), 1999 UT 99. "When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we review the district
court's conclusions of law for correctness and give them no deference." Grappendorf v. Pleasant
Grove City. 173 P.3d 166, Tf 5 (Utah 2007), 2007 UT 84, Blackner v. State, 48 P.3d 949, If 8
(Utah 2002), 2002 UT 44. This issue was preserved. (R 712-729).
APPELLEE'S ISSUE NO. 2 (See Appellant's Issues Nos. 2 and 13): Did the district
court rule correctly that Cooper was entitled to judgment against Brighton Title as a matter of
law and that no genuine issues of material fact existed precluding summary judgment? "When
reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we review the district court's conclusions of law for
correctness and give them no deference." Grappendorf, 173 P.3d 166, at ^ 5 Blackner, 48 P.3d
949, at | 8. The appellate court reviews the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party and makes any reasonable inferences in its favor. Johnson v. Hermes Assocs., 128 P.3d
1151, at 1| 2 (Utah 2005) 2005 UT 82. This issue was preserved. (R 469-577).
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APPELLEE'S ISSUE NO. 3 (See Appellant's Issue Nos. 3 and 7): Did the district court
fail to provide analysis or reasoning explaining the basis for granting Cooper summary judgment,
and if so, did the district court err as a matter of law and abuse its discretion in so doing? "When
reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we review the district court's conclusions of law
for correctness and give them no deference." Grappendorf, 173 P.3d 166, at | 5 Blackner, 48
P.3d 949, at | 8. This issue was preserved. (R 727). Additionally, did the district court err as a
matter of law in signing the ruling prepared by counsel for Cooper. (See Appellant's Issue No.
7)? Kotter, 206 P.3d 633, at Tf 9; In re A.M., 2009 UT App 118, at If 9; Ostler, 989 P.2d 1073, at
f 5. "When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we review the district court's conclusions
of law for correctness and give them no deference." Grappendorf, 173 P.3d 166, at f
5 Blackner, 48 P.3d 949, at If 8. This issue was preserved. (R 742- 45).
APPELLEE'S ISSUE NO. 4 (See Appellant's Issue No. 5): Did the district court err as a
matter of law in concluding Brighton Title owed any fiduciary duty to Cooper? Kotter, 206 P.3d
633, at K 9; In re A.M., 208 P.3d 1058, at 1f 9; Ostler, 989 P.2d 1073 at | 5. "When reviewing a
grant of summary judgment, we review the district court's conclusions of law for correctness and
give them no deference." Grappendorf, 173 P.3d 166, % 5 Blackner, 48 P.3d 949, f 8. This issue
was preserved. (R 482-83).
APPELLEE'S ISSUE NO. 5 (See Appellant's Issues Nos. 6, 11 and 12): Did the district
court err in concluding the Utah Department of Insurance Bulletin did not have the force of law
and cannot be used to excuse Brighton Title's conduct? Kotter, 206 P.3d 633, at ^f 9; In re A.M.,
208 P.3d 1058, at If 9; Ostler, 989 P.2d 1073, at If 5. "When reviewing a grant of summary
judgment, we review the district court's conclusions of law for correctness and give them no
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deference." Grappendorf, 173 P.3d 166, at 1 5 Blackner, 48 P.3d 949, at p . This issue was
preserved (R 480-82).1
APPELLEE'S ISSUE NO. 6 (See Appellant's Issue No. 8): Did the district court correctly
rule Brighton Title did not have an interest sufficient to challenge an award of attorney fees
against Defendant Deseret Sky Development, LLC, where the district court did not enter that
1

Appellee's Issue No. 6 is related to Appellant's Issue No. 11, and with regard to
Appellant's Issue No. 11, OBJECTION AS TO APPELLANT'S ISSUE NO. 11. Appellant's
Issue No. 11, is articulated by the Appellant as follows:
Issue No. 11: Did the district court err as a matter of law in concluding
Brighton Title breached its duties to Cooper where the transaction was an illegal
flip? This issue presents a question of law which is reviewed de novo. Savage v. Utah
Youth VilL 2004 UT 102,1117, 104 P.3d 1242. This issue was preserved. (R 48081).
Appellant's Issue No. 11 begs the question by presuming conclusions of law, i.e., "[T]he
transaction was an illegal flip." Appellee articulates the Appellant's Issue No. 11 as follows:
Was the transaction underlying the real estate purchase contract in question illegal, excusing
Brighton Title's breach of its duties to Cooper as escrow agent for the transaction underlying the
real estate purchase contract in question? Kotter, 206 P.3d 633, at \ 9; In re A.M., 208 P.3d
1058, at \ 9; Ostler, ^ 5, 989 P.2d 1073. "When reviewing a grant of summary judgment,
we review the district court's conclusions of law for correctness and give them no
deference." Grappendorf, 173 P.3d 166, at If 5; Blackner, 48 P.3d 949, at K 8. This issue was
preserved. (R 480-81). Appellant's Issue No. 11 is related to Appellant's Issue No. 12, and with
regard to Issue No. 12, OBJECTION AS TO APPELLANT'S ISSUE NO. 12. Appellant's Issue
No. 12, is articulated by the Appellant as follows:
Issue No. 12: Did the district court err as a matter of law in ruling a title
company may act as an escrow agent where they are unable to insure the
transaction because one of the parties' [sic] is not on title to the property? This
issue presents a question of law which isrevieweddkflomSavage v. Utah Youth Vill, 2004
UT 102417,101 P3d 1242. Thisissue was preserved. (R 483).
Appellant's Issue No. 12 begs the question by presuming facts not established and/or presuming
conclusions of law, i.e., "[Brighton Title was] unable to insure the transaction because one of the
parties' [sic] is not on title to the property." Appellee articulates the Appellant's Issue No. 12 as
follows: If Brighton Title was unable to insure the transaction because one of the parties is not on
title to the property, is Brighton Title excused from its duties as an escrow agent for the
transaction? "When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we review the district court's
conclusions of law for correctness and give them no deference." Grappendorf, 173 P.3d 166, at
11 5; Blackner, 48 P.3d 949, at 1j 8.
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attorney's fee award against Brighton Title? The trial court's determination of the legal
requirements for standing are reviewed for correctness. D.U. Co., Inc. v. Jenkins, — P.3d -—,
2009,If 11 (Utah Ct. App. 2009), 2009 UT App 195; Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808,ffif10-11
(Utah 2007), 2007 UT 20. This issue was preserved (R 769).
APPELLEE'S ISSUE NO. 7 (See Appellant's Issue No. 10V. Did the district court err as a
matter of law in concluding the seller of real property did not have to hold fee title at all times
during the executory period of the real estate purchase contract? Kotter, 206 P.3d 633, at 19; In
re A.M., 208 P.3d 1058, at If 9; Ostler, 989 P.2d 1073, at ^ 5. "When reviewing a grant of
summary judgment, we review the district court's conclusions of law for correctness and give
them no deference." Grappendorf, 173 P.3d 166, at f 5 Blackner, 48 P.3d 949, at f 8. This issue
was preserved. (R 478-80).
OBJECTION AS TO APPELLANT'S ISSUE NO. 4. THIS IS ISSUE IS RAISED FOR
THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. Appellant's Issue No. 4 is articulated by the Appellants as
follows:
Issue No. 4: Did the district court err as a matter of law in concluding
Brighton Title was bound by the terms of a real estate purchase contract to
which it was not a party? This issue presents a question of law that is reviewed de
novo. Savage v.Utah Youth VilL, 104 P.3d 1242 (Utah 2004), 2004 UT 102. This
issue was preserved. (R 483-85).
There is no record of this issue having been raised by Brighton Title, nor is there record of
Brighton Title having preserved such an issue for appeal. Brighton ostensibly provides record
citations in support of its claim that it preserved its contract defense, but those citations neither
raise nor preserve the question of whether Brighton Title was a party to the contract.
Accordingly, the appellate court should not address that issue (Firkins v. Ruegner, — P.3d -—,
2009 WL 1803243 (Utah App.), 2009 UT App 167, n.5 (citing Ong Int'KU.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th
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Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993) (citing Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of Educ.,797
P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1990) (citing Pratt v. City Council 639 P.2d 172, 173-74 (Utah 1981)
("With limited exceptions, the practice of this court has been to decline consideration of issues
raised for the first time on appeal.") (internal quotation marks omitted)).
OBJECTION AS TO APPELLANT'S ISSUE NO. 9. Appellant's Issue No. 9, is
articulated by the Appellant as follows:

j

Issue No. 9: Did the district court correctly conclude Brighton Title
breached its contractual obligations to Cooper where Cooper first breached the
contract by representing it was the fee title owner of the property when it was
not? This issue presents a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Savage v. Utah Youth
VOL, 2004 UT 102, 1117, 104 P.3d 1242. This issue was preserved. (R 478-80).
Appellant's Issue No. 9 begs the question by presuming facts not established, i.e., "Cooper first
breached the contract." Appellee articulates Appellant's Issue No. 9 as follows: Did Cooper
breach the real estate purchase contract underlying the instant action by representing it was the
fee title owner of the property? Kotter, 206 P.3d 633, at K 9; In re A.M., 208 P.3d 1058, at \ 9;
Ostler, 989 P.2d 1073, at If 5. "When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we review the
district court's conclusions of law for correctness and give them no deference" (Grappendorf, 173
P.3d 166, at If 5 Blackner, 48 P.3d 949, at \ 8), and if Cooper first breached the contract by
representing it was the fee title owner of the property when it was not, did the district court
correctly conclude Brighton Title nevertheless breached its contractual obligations to Cooper?
This issue was preserved. (R 478-80). Kotter, 206 P.3d 633, at \ 9; In re A.M., 208 P.3d 1058, at
If 9; Ostler, 989 P.2d 1073, at ^ 5. "When reviewing a grant of summary judgment,
we review the district court's conclusions of law for correctness and give them no
deference." Grappendorf 173 P.3d 166, at 1f 5 Blackner, 48 P.3d 949, at 1 8. (R 478-80).
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UTAH CODE SECTION WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE OF THE
APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL
Utah Code § 31 A-23a-406 - this code section is fully cited in the Addendum to
Appellant's Brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a matter of claims Appellee Cooper Enterprises, P.C. ("Cooper") made, as Seller,
against Deseret Sky Development, LLC ("Deseret Sky"), as Purchaser, and against the Appellant
Brighton Title Company, LLC ("Brighton Title"), as escrow holder, respecting claims for
liquidated damages, costs and attorney's fees, as provided in a Real Estate Purchase Contract for
Land ("REPC").
The case comes before the Utah Court of Appeals following the district court granting
Cooper's Motion for Summary Judgment against Defendants Deseret Sky and Brighton Title.
(Deseret Sky did not oppose Cooper's Motion for Summary Judgment.)
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR
REVIEW
Brighton Title does not dispute any of the following statements of fact made by the
moving party on Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment (R 471-477; 578-584):
1.

Cooper Enterprises, P.C. ("Cooper"), is a Utah professional corporation in good

standing, doing business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah (Affidavit of Robert T. Cooper, Jr.
("Cooper Affidavit"), If 3 (R 198); Complaint, 1f 1 (R 1); Answer of Brighton Title, 11 (R 32);
Counterclaim of Deseret Sky, | C (R 51)).
2.

Deseret Sky Development, L.L.C. ("Deseret Sky"), is a Utah limited liability

company in good standing, doing business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah (Complaint, ^ 2
(R 1); Answer of Brighton Title, 1 2 (R 32); Answer of Deseret Sky, f 2 (R 44)).
10

3.

Brighton Title Company, L.L.C., is a Utah limited Liability company in good

standing, doing business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah (Complaint, ^ 3 (R 2); Answer of
Brighton Title, | 3 (R 32); Answer of Deseret Sky, f 3 (R 44)).
4.

The real property which is the subject hereof is located in Salt Lake County, State

of Utah, and known generally as Danish Heights Estates PUD or 2745 East Creek Road,
Cottonwood Heights, Salt Lake County, Utah (the "Real Property") (Complaint, | 5 (R 2);
Answer of Brighton Title, 1 5 (R 33); Answer of Deseret Sky, If 5 (R 44)).
5.

By Real Estate Purchase Contract for Land, with offer reference date of May 25,

2007, as modified by Addendum Nos. 1, 2 and 3 (the "REPC"), Cooper agreed to sell, and
Deseret Sky agreed to buy the Real Property (Cooper Affidavit, 14 (R 198); Complaint, ^ 6
(R 2); Answer of Deseret Sky, 16 (R 44)).
6.

At the time the REPC was entered into, Cooper had a contractual right to

purchase the Real Property (Cooper Affidavit, ^ 6 (R 199-200)).
7.

Angela Gowans was at all relevant times a real estate agent employed by Great

American Properties, whose principal broker is Wes Williams (Deposition of Angela Gowans,
dated April 29, 2008 (hereinafter referred to as "Gowans Depo."), Pg. 6, lines 12-19 (R 257)).
8.

At all relevant times, Angela Gowans was Deseret Sky's agent for purposes of the

REPC (Deposition of Angela Gowans, Deposition Exhibit 3 (R 280-289)). All depositions taken
in this case have used the same set of exhibits and are hereinafter referred to as "Depo. Ex.
").

9.

On May 27, 2007, Ms. Gowans received from Cooper a conditional use

application, preliminary plat submittal which included all applications, title, and geotechnical
information, drawings and engineering information, along with the Cottonwood Heights
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Preliminary Plat Approval, Application Acceptance Letter, Fencing Proposal, Permit Report,
correspondence with Cottonwood Heights City, sellers disclosures, and minutes from the
Cottonwood Heights Improvement District pertaining to the Real Property also known as Danish
Heights project (Gowans Depo., Pg. 24, lines 4-25 (R 258); Pg. 25, lines 1-3 and 13-16 (R 259);
Pg. 28, lines 9-25 (R 259); Pg. 29, lines 1-5 (R 260); Pg. 29, lines 14-25 (R 260); Pg. 30, lines 111 (R 260); Depo. Ex. 4 (R 291-293); Depo. Ex. 5 (R 295-343); Depo. Ex. 6 (R 345-413)).
10.

On or about June 1, 2007, Ms. Gowans received from Cooper the Hansen

Contract (showing Cooper Enterprises' contract interest for purchase of the Real Property)
(Gowans Depo., Pg. 36, lines 1-15 (R 261); Depo. Ex. 8 (R 415-427)).
11.

Angela Gowans had "a dozen" conversations with Deseret Sky representatives

and representatives of Brighton Title Company, L.L.C. ("Brighton Title") in subsequent days
respecting the subject of the materials Cooper provided and the fact that Cooper Enterprises, P.C.
did not hold fee title to the Real Property (Gowans Depo., Pg. 27, lines 15-25 (R 259); Pg. 28,
lines 5-6 (R 259); Pg. 35, lines 15-25 (R 261); Pg. 36, lines 22-25 (R 261); Pg. 37, lines 1-9 (R
262)).
12.

Additionally, on May 31, 2007, Brighton Title was aware that Cooper did not

hold fee title to the Real Property (Deposition of Jeffrey Gorringe, Brighton Title's Rule 30(b)(6)
witness, taken April 30, 2008 (hereinafter "Gorringe Depo."), Pg. 17, lines 12-24 (R 268)).
13.

The next day (June 1, 2007), Brighton Title so informed Deseret Sky (Gorringe

Depo., Pg. 18, lines 10-12 (R 268)).
14.

The REPC, paragraph 2(a) reflected an initial earnest money deposit of One

Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00), and provided: "THIS DEPOSIT MAY BECOME
TOTALLY NON-REFUNDABLE" (REPC, Depo. Ex. 3 (R 280-289)).
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15.

Paragraph 2 of Addendum No. 1 to the REPC provides:

2)
Earnest Money to be $100,000 deposited w/ Brighton Title Company upon
acceptance. An additional $100,000 earnest money to be deposited with Brighton
Title Company after Buyer's Due Diligence deadline. Total of $200,000 shall [be]
non-refundable after June 8, 2007 REPC, Depo. Ex. 3 (R 280-289).
16.

Addendum No. 2 to the REPC provides:

1.
REPC, Section 2(d) $100,000 additional earnest money due on
June 8, 2007 by 5:00 PM MDT...
6. [sic] $100,000 Earnest Money to be non-refundable but applicable and
immediately released to Seller on June 8,2007 at 5:00 pm MDT.
6.
An additional $100,000 Earnest Money will be deposited on
June 8, 2007 by 5:00 pm MDT which is non-refundable but applicable and
immediately released to Seller on June 8,2007 at 5:00 pm MDT.
17.

Addendum No. 3 provides:

4)
All earnest monies shall be deposited with Brighton Title initially
and shall be released to Metro National Title on June 8, 2007 at 5:00 pm MST
REPC, Depo. Ex. 3 (R 280-289).
Under the terms of the REPC, $100,000 was deposited with Brighton Title, as also evidenced by
letter of receipt by Brighton Title ("Letter Receipt"), dated June 5, 2007, over the signature of
Jeff Gorringe (Gorringe Depo., Pg. 21, lines 2-16 (R 269); Pg. 28, lines 17-23 (R 270); Pg. 29,
lines 1-9 (R 271); Depo. Ex. 11 (R 429)).
18.

Brighton Title accepted the initial $ 100,000 earnest money from Deseret Sky in

escrow, in its capacity as an escrow agent (Gorringe Depo., Pg. 21, lines 2-25 through Pg. 22,
lines 1-16 (R 269); Pg. 25, lines 5-10 (R 270)).
19.

Paragraph 8 of the REPC provides:

8.
BUYER'S RIGHT TO CANCEL BASED ON BUYER'S DUE
DILIGENCE. Buyer's obligation to purchase under this Contract (check
applicable boxes):
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(a) [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the content of all
the Seller Disclosures referenced in Section 7;
(b) [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of a physical
condition inspection of the Property;
(c) [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of a survey of the
Property by a licensed surveyor;
(d) [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of applicable
federal, state and local governmental laws, ordinances and regulations affecting
the Property; and any applicable deed restrictions and/or CC&R's (covenants,
conditions and restrictions) affecting the Property;
(e) [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon the Property appraising for not less
than the Purchase Price;
(f) [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the terms and
conditions of any mortgage financing referenced in Section 2 above;
(g) [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the following
tests and evaluations of the Property: (specify) Any additional deemed necessary
by Buyer.
If any of items 8(a) through 8(g) are checked in the affirmative, then Sections
8.1, 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4 apply; otherwise, they do not apply. The items checked in the
affirmative above are collectively referred to as Buyer's "Due Diligence.". . .
(REPC, Depo. Ex. 3 (R 280-289))
20.

Paragraph 8.1 of the REPC provides:

Due Diligence Deadline. No later than the Due Diligence Deadline referenced in
Section 24(b) Buyer shall: (a) complete all of Buyer's Due Diligence; and
(b) determine if the results of Buyer's Due Diligence are acceptable to Buyer
(REPC, Depo. Ex. 3 (R 280-289)).
21.

In accordance with the REPC, the earnest monies ($200,000 total) become non-

refundable on June 8, 2007, unless the REPC was timely cancelled by Deseret Sky. In that
regard, the REPC provides:
8.2
Right to Cancel or Object. If Buyer determines that the results of
Buyer's Due Diligence are unacceptable, Buyer may, no later than the Due
Diligence Deadline, either: (a) cancel this Contract by providing written notice to
Seller, whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Buyer; or
(b) provide Seller with written notice of objections.
8.3
Failure to Respond. If by the expiration of the Due Diligence
Deadline, Buyer does not (a) cancel this Contract as provided in Section 8.2; or
(b) deliver a written objection to Seller regarding the Buyer's Due Diligence, the
Buyer's Due Diligence shall be deemed approved by Buyer and the contingencies
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referenced in Sections 8(a) through 8(g), including but not limited to, any
financing contingency, shall be deemed waived by Buyer. (REPC, Depo. Ex. 3
(R 280-289))
22.

Paragraph 24 of the REPC provided for a Due Diligence Deadline of June 8, 2007

(REPC, Depo. Ex. 3 (R 280-289)).
23.

The REPC provides, in paragraph 16:

16. DEFAULT. If Buyer defaults, Seller may elect to . . . retain the
Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages. . .. (REPC Depo. Ex. 3 (R 280289))
24.

The REPC provides, in paragraph 17:

17. ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS. In the event of litigation . . . to
enforce this contract, the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable
attorneys fees. .. .(REPC, Depo. Ex. 3 (R 280-289))
25.

The earnest money for the transaction at issue was on deposit with Brighton Title

on June 5, 2007, despite the fact that since on or about May 27, 2007, and at the latest June 1,
2007, Deseret Sky knew that Cooper wasn't in title to the property (Statement Undisputed Facts
of Plaintiff s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, ff 9, 10, 11, 12 and
13 (R 231-232)).
26.

Deseret Sky neither canceled the REPC by providing written notice to Seller nor

delivered a written objection to Seller regarding the Buyer's Due Diligence by the June 8, 2007
Due Diligence Deadline (Cooper Affidavit, 1 8 (R 200); Gowans Depo., Pg. 54, lines 11-25
through Pg. 55, lines 1-5 (R 263); Gorringe Depo., Pg. 35, lines 7-24 (R 272)).
27.

Brighton Title was to receive an additional $100,000 by the end of Deseret Sky's

Diligence Period, if the contract wasn't cancelled or objected to by that date (REPC Depo. Ex. 3
(R 280-289); Addendum No. 1, f 2, and Addendum No. 2, f t 1 and 6 (R 284-287); Gorringe
Depo., Pg. 25, lines 11-19 (R 270)).
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28.

The June 8? 2007 Due Diligence Deadline came and went without Deseret Sky

depositing an additional $1005000.00 (Gorringe Depo. Pg. 25, lines 11-21 (R 270)).
29.

The REPC itself does not identify the underlying transaction as a "split closing"

(REPC Depo. Ex. 3 (R 280-289));
30.

In response to the following question posed to Jeffrey Gorringe in his deposition

(Page 25, lines 5-10 (R 270)), Gorringe testified as follows:
Q: I just want to make clear. So when you received the money, you received
the contract, you understood that you would be holding that money in escrow to
fulfill the obligations contained in this contract, Deposition Exhibit 3. Correct?
A: Yes.
(Gorringe Deposition, Page 25, line 10 (R 270))
31.

Mr. Gorringe further testified in his deposition: (i) that he understood that

additional earnest money was to be deposited under the terms of the contract under certain
conditions (Gorringe Deposition, Page 25, lines 11-14 (R 270)); (ii) that those conditions were
that if the contract had not been canceled or objected to within the diligence period that another
$100,000 was due (Gorringe Deposition, Page 25, lines 15-19 (R 270)); (iii) that under the
contract Brighton Title was to forward the earnest money deposits to Metro National Title if the
contract was not cancelled or objected to by the buyer after expiration of the REPC's diligence
period (Gorringe Deposition, Page 25, lines 11-14 (R 270)); and (iv) that none of the earnest
money deposit was ever forwarded to Metro National Title (Gorringe Deposition, Page 25, line
24 to Page 26, line 15 (R 270)).
32.

On June 11, 2007, Deseret Sky sent a letter (back-dated to June 8, 2007) to Robert

Cooper ostensibly terminating the REPC and instructing Brighton Title "to return all earnest
money deposits to the Buyer." (Cooper Affidavit, ffl[ 8, 9 and 10 (R 200); Depo. Ex. 12 (R 431)).
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33.

On June 12 of 2007 (four days after expiration of the diligence period, without

cancellation or objection by Deseret Sky), Jeff Gorringe of Brighton Title informed Cooper that
Brighton Title was going to release the earnest money deposit back to Deseret Sky even though
Brighton Title was informed that Cooper claimed the money. (Gorringe Depo., Pg. 47, lines 2025 through Pg. 48, lines 1-15 (R 274)).
34.

By letter dated June 13, 2007, Wayne Gorringe of Brighton Title informed

Deseret Sky:
a. that the $100,000 Brighton Title held in escrow were being returned to Deseret Sky;
b. that (despite the diligence period under REPC having expired five days prior (i.e.,
June 8, 2007), Brighton Title held out hope of "completing] this transaction."
(Gorringe Depo, Pg. 44, lines 2-25 (R 273); Depo. Ex. 14 (R 433)).
35.

According to the REPC, after the end of that Diligence Period, if the contract

wasn't cancelled or objected to, the earnest money was then to be forwarded to Metro National
Title (REPC, Depo. Ex. 3, Addendum No. 3, | 4 (R 288-289); Gorringe Depo, Pg. 26, lines 5-12
(R 270); Pg. 34, lines 8-23 (R 272); Pg. 36, lines 6-12 (R 272)).
36.

None of the earnest money was ever forwarded to Metro National Title, but was

instead released back to Deseret Sky even though Brighton Title was aware of Cooper
Enterprises' claim to the deposit (Gorringe Depo, Pg. 26, lines 13-15 (R 270); Pg. 48, lines 3-11
(R 274); Pg. 59, lines 22-25 (R 276); Pg. 60, lines 1-18 (R 27)).
37.

Even after the REPC's June 8, 2007 diligence period had expired, Deseret Sky

was still in discussions with Cooper concerning the potential of having a new contract for the
property. These discussions continued for almost a month and a half after the diligence period
expired (Gowans Depo, Pg. 55, lines 6-10 (R 263); Pg. 56, lines 13-25 (R 263); Pg. 57, lines 1-
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25 (R 264); Pg. 58, lines 12-25 (R 264); Pg. 59, lines 1-25 (R 264); Pg. 60, lines 1-25 (R 264);
Pg. 61, lines 1-17 (R 265); Pg. 62, lines 10-25 through Pg. 63, lines 1-24 (R 265); Gorringe
Depo., Pg. 55, lines 12-22 (R 275); Depo. Exhibits 16 and 17 (R 440-443; 445-448)).
38.

As a result of Deseret Sky's default of its obligations under the REPC, no sale

was transacted and Cooper was unable to purchase the Real Property under the Hansen Contract,
causing Cooper to suffer an actual loss of $1,034,666.66 profit and to forfeit the $100,000 that .
Cooper had deposited in accordance with the Hansen Contract to acquire the Real Property
(which would then, in turn, be sold to Deseret Sky). (Cooper Affidavit; ^ [ 7 , 11, 12 and 13
(R 200-201)).
39.

Cooper elected to accept the earnest money as liquidated damages for Deseret

Sky's default. (Cooper Affidavit, ^ 14 (R 201); Depo. Ex. 15 (R 435-438)).
40.

Cooper has made demand on Deseret Sky for payment of $200,000 as Earnest

Money Deposit, as liquidated damages under the terms of the REPC, which Deseret Sky has
failed and refused to pay (Complaint, Ex. C (R 20-23); Cooper Affidavit, ffif 14 and 15 (R 201);
Depo. Ex. 15 (R 435-438)).
41.

Cooper has made demand on Brighton Title for payment of $ 100,000 initial

earnest money deposit, as liquidated damages under the terms of the REPC, which Brighton Title
has failed and refused to pay (Complaint, Ex. C (R 20-23); Cooper Affidavit ^f 14 and 15
(R 201); Depo. Ex. 15 (R 435-438)).
42.

Cooper has retained the services of an attorney to enforce its rights as set forth

above and is entitled to an award of the attorney's fees and costs pursuant to paragraph 17 of the
REPC (Cooper Affidavit, 116 (R 202); REPC Depo. Ex. 3 (R 280-289)).
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Under the terms of a Real Estate Purchase Contract for Land ("REPC"), an initial
$100,000.00 in earnest money was to be deposited with Brighton Title. All of the earnest money
was to become non-refundable and delivered to the Seller (Cooper) unless the contract was
cancelled or objection made regarding Purchaser's (Deseret Sky's) diligence investigations.
Neither objection nor cancellation was provided by Purchaser to Seller within the diligence
period provided by the terms of the REPC. Nevertheless, contrary to the terms of the REPC,
after the expiration of the diligence period, Brighton Title returned to Deseret Sky the initial
$100,000.00 earnest money deposit it was holding in escrow.
Even though Deseret Sky did not properly object or terminate the contract timely,
Brighton Title contends that it is not liable to Cooper because Cooper did not hold fee title to the
property at the time the REPC was entered into (Appellant Brief, pages 38-40); however, Cooper
(which was under contract to purchase the real property and thereafter transfer title to Deseret
Sky) was not required to hold fee title.
Brighton Title also claims it is not liable to Cooper because the form of the transaction
was prohibited by a bulletin issued by the Insurance Commissioner of the Utah Insurance
Department (Appellant Brief, pages 21-22). Even Brighton Title, however, expressly concedes
that the bulletin is merely advisory in nature, with no legal effect.
While Brighton Title contends that "[t]here are issues of fact which precluded both parties
from being granted summary judgment," (Appellant Brief, pages 21) the record reveals no
genuine issues of material fact exist to preclude the district court from granting Cooper's Motion
for Summary Judgment. Brighton Title expressly conceded, in its Memorandum in Opposition
to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and In Support of Brighton Title's Motion for
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Summary Judgment in the instant action, that there were no genuine issues of material fact (R
478,585,697).
Brighton Title's contention that the district court committed reversible error when it
granted Cooper's Motion for Summary Judgment without providing "analysis and reasoning for
its decision (Appellant Brief, page 21)" is without merit as both a matter of record in the district
court and of black letter law. Likewise, Brighton Title's contention that the district court
committed reversible error by executing Cooper's draft of a proposed Ruling, is also without
merit and without support in the law.
Brighton Title's contention that "a title company should not be bound to the terms of a
contract to which it is not a party nor to which it has consented [sic] (Appellant Brief, page 21)"
is a diversionary argument. The district court did not grant summary judgment on the basis that
the Brighton Title was a party to the contract in question; moreover, the issue was not preserved
for appeal.
Brighton Title's contention that it has no joint fiduciary duty (Appellant Brief, page 21) is
without merit. Title companies are liable for the improper disbursement of funds they hold in
escrow, and it is well established that an escrow agent is held to a high standard of care in
dealing with its principals and assumes the role of the agent of both parties to the transaction.
Brighton Title's "belief (respecting its challenge to the award of attorney's fees to
Cooper against Deseret Sky) that any defendant party to a lawsuit has the right to object to any
ruling of the court, even if the ruling is not made as to that particular defendant party (Appellant
Brief, page 22), has no support of any legal authority and no support in reason or the fundamental
principles of civil litigation.
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By the same token, Brighton Title's "belief that "it cannot be held liable for its alleged
breach of contract (Appellant Brief, page 22)" because "Cooper breached first by affirmatively
misrepresenting its state of ownership in the property" is without support as a matter of wellestablished and settled Utah real property law.
Brighton Title's argument that a title company, acting as escrow agent and insurer, is
precluded by law from participating in transactions it cannot insure (Appellant Brief, pages 2223) is without support in the facts or the law applicable to the instant case.
Having accepted the initial $100,000 earnest money from Deseret Sky in escrow, in its
capacity as an escrow agent, Brighton Title was to forward these funds to Metro National
Title (which in turn would be obligated to forward the earnest money on to Cooper) if the
contract was not cancelled or objected to by the date the diligence period expired. Brighton
Title did not forward the earnest money, but instead released the $100,000 back to Deseret
Sky in default of its obligations to Cooper. When there are conflicting claims to the fund held by
the escrow agent, the agent is neither required nor permitted to make his own determination as to
the rights of the rival claimants. Title companies are liable for improper disbursement of funds
they hold in escrow.
When the Diligence Period expired without objection or cancellation, Brighton Title had
three rightful options with respect to the disposition of the earnest money that it held on deposit.
Instead, Brighton Title chose a fourth path of wrongfully returning the initial earnest money
deposit to Deseret Sky. Brighton Title is thus liable to Cooper for the amount of the initial
deposit.
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ARGUMENTS
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT RULE THAT BRIGHTON TITLE
"VIOLATED" RULE 7(c)(3)(B) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, NOR DID THE DISTRICT COURT GRANT SUMMARY
JUDGMENT BASED UPON A "VIOLATION" OF RULE 7(c)(3)(B) OF
THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

The appellant contends that the district court erred as a matter of law in ruling Brighton
Title violated Rule 7(c)(3)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In its Minute Entry of
February 19,2009, however, the district court expressly states, "Brighton Title's failure to comply
with the requirement of Rule 7 [(c)(3)(B)] was noted, but that was not the basis for the ruling,"
and "Since there were no material issues of fact, the matter was decided on the law." (R 783) The
district court clearly did not base its ruling on the application of Rule 7(c)(3)(B). Accordingly,
there is no error in the application of Rule 7(c)(3)(B) upon which to appeal the district court's
ruling.
II.

THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT AND
COOPER IS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.

While Brighton Title contends that "[t]here are issues of fact which precluded both
parties from being granted summary judgment," (Appellant Brief, page 21) the record reveals no
genuine issues of material fact exist to preclude the district court from granting Cooper's Motion
for Summary Judgment. Brighton Title itself expressly conceded, in its Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and In Support of Brighton Title's
Motion for Summary Judgment:
In the instant action, there are no genuine issues of material fact. While Brighton
expresses no opinion or argument on the Plaintiffs right to judgment against
Defendant Deseret Sky, Brighton argues that as a matter of law, Plaintiff is not
entitled to judgment against Brighton. This Court must deny Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment against Brighton. However, because there are no genuine
issues of material fact[.] (R 478, 585)
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(Emphasis added.)
Although Brighton Title concedes that it does not dispute the facts alleged by Cooper in
Cooper's Motion for Summary Judgment, Brighton Title still contends that it presented the
district court with "additional facts which should have created a genuine issue of material fact"
sufficient to preclude the granting of summary judgment. These "additional facts" are, according
to Brighton Title, that Cooper did not hold fee title to the property that was the subject of the
REPC, which Brighton Title contends raises an issue of fact as to whether Cooper held
sufficient interest in the real property to contract to sell it to Deseret Sky. Such "additional
facts," however, 1) were already part of the record and known to the district court at the point
when the court ruled on both Cooper's Motion for Summary Judgment and on Brighton Title's
Motion for Summary Judgment; and 2) as shall be shown infra, Brighton Title's "additional
facts," are not material to Cooper's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Brighton Title contends in its Brief (See Appellant's Brief at page 24) that the affidavit of
Richard Peter Stevens established a "question of fact" as to whether Utah Insurance Department
Bulletin 2007-1 has the force of law. Such contention, however, is patently and conclusively
without merit. Brighton Title itself correctly concedes, inter alia: "[T]he Court need not give
deference to the interpretative Bulletin .. .(Appellant Brief, page 27)," "Admittedly, the Bulletin
[2007-1] is interpretative and therefore this Court need not give deference to the interpretation
set forth in Bulletin 2007-1;" and "Bulletins do not have the force of law and cannot be violated
per se." (See Paragraph 6, Affidavit of Richard Peter Stevens, form Assistant Commissioner of
Given that it is undisputed Cooper did not hold fee title to the property that was the subject of
the REPC, such raises a question of law—not of fact—as to whether Cooper held sufficient
interest in the real property to contract to sell it to Deseret Sky.
Brighton Title's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment,
page 11 (R 588).
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the Utah Department of Insurance (Exhibit "H" to Bright Title's Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (R 669)). Indeed, Brighton Title's concession on
these points comports with the law (See Appellee5 s Argument VI, infra).
Brighton Title contends that the oral statement of Brighton Title's Jeff Gorringe (averred
to have been made June 1, 20084, allegedly informing Metro National Title that Deseret Sky
would not close on the transaction because Cooper was not in title) constituted an objection
before the June 8, 2008 due diligence expiration date. Even if Brighton Title's contention were
true (and it is not; objections under the REPC were required to be in writing and made by the
buyer, see infra), such an ostensible fact does not raise a genuine and material issue that
precluded the district court from granting Cooper's Motion for Summary Judgment. Paragraph
24 of the REPC provided for a Due Diligence Deadline of June 8, 2007 (R 234 and 283).
Paragraph 8.1 provides:
Due Diligence Deadline. No later than the Due Diligence Deadline
referenced in Section 24(b) Buyer shall: (a) complete all of Buyer's Due
Diligence; and (b) determine if the results of Buyer's Due Diligence are
acceptable to Buyer. (R281)
In accordance with the REPC, the earnest monies became non-refundable on June 8,
2007, unless the REPC was timely cancelled by Deseret Sky. In that regard, the REPC provides:
8.2 Right to Cancel or Object. If Buyer determines that the results
of Buyer's Due Diligence are unacceptable, Buyer may, no later than the Due
Diligence Deadline, either: (a) cancel this Contract by providing written
notice to Seller, whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to
Buyer; or (b) provide Seller with written notice of objections.
8.3 Failure to Respond. If by the expiration of the Due
Diligence Deadline, Buyer does not (a) cancel this Contract as provided in
Section 8.2; or (b) deliver a written objection to Seller regarding the Buyer's
Due Diligence, the Buyer's Due Diligence shall be deemed approved by Buyer
Brighton Title likely meant to contend that Mr. Gorringe made his alleged oral statement to
Metro National Title was made on June 1, 2007, not 2008 (See ^ 14 of the Affidavit of Jeff
Gorringe R 566-567).
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and the contingencies referenced in Sections 8(a) through 8(g), including but not
limited to, any financing contingency, shall be deemed waived by Buyer. (R 281)
Under the provisions of the REPC, objection or cancellation by the Buyer had to take the form of
"written notice to Seller." Jeff Gorringe's alleged oral statement of indeterminate date5 to Metro
National Title clearly does not constitute compliance with paragraphs 8.2 and 8.3 of the REPC.
Accordingly, Jeff Gorringe's alleged oral statement to Metro National Title does not raise a
genuine and material issue that precluded the district court from granting Cooper's Motion for
Summary Judgment. Moreover, Brighton Title accepted the earnest money in escrow as of
June 5, 2007, four days after it claims to have made objection to the contract.
Further, the mere opinions of Matt Sager (underwriting counsel for Stewart Guaranty
Company) articulated in his affidavit (R 570-574) do not raise a genuine issue of material fact
that precluded the district court from granting Cooper's Motion for Summary Judgment. It is not
the province of Jeff Gorringe, Matt Sager, and people like them to arrogate to themselves the
district court's construction or the application of the law. Notwithstanding, even Matt Sager
does not "conclude" that the REPC was an illegal transaction (R 572), even though Brighton
Title claims he did (See Appellant Brief, page 24).
While Brighton Title contends, on appeal, that there was a question of fact concerning
"whether Cooper had any practical ability to obtain title during the executory period of the REPC
without violating Utah law (Appellant Brief, page 25)," Brighton Title conceded in its
Memorandum in Support of its Counter Motion for Summary Judgment (R 478-480) that Cooper
was not required under Utah law to be on title during the executory period of the REPC, and that
a seller under a real estate contract that represents itself as having title need not have marketable
5

In his affidavit Mr. Gorringe does not indicate on what date he allegedly made his oral
statement to Metro National Title (See If 14 of the Affidavit of Jeff Gorringe R 566-567).
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title until final payment is made or tendered.6 Thus, Brighton Title raised no genuine and
material issue as to title that precluded the district court from granting Cooper's Motion for
Summary Judgment.
III.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT "FAIL" TO MAKE FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN GRANTING COOPER
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND THUS DID NOT ERR.

Brighton Title contends in its Appellate Brief (page 46), "The trial court err[ed] as a
matter of law and abused its discretion by failing to provide any analysis or reasoning in granting
Cooper summary judgment." Brighton Title cites Orvis v. Johnson (177 P.3d 600 (Utah 2008),
2008 UT 2) for the proposition that the district court was required to make factual findings
and/or to articulate its legal conclusions when granting Cooper's motion for summary judgment,
but Orvis articulates no such rule. Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in
pertinent part:
The trial court need not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings on
motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief
written statement of the ground for its decision on all motions granted under
Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based on more than one
ground, (emphasis added)
Brighton Title's citation to 9[C] Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice &
Procedure, § 2579 (1971) for the proposition that a trial court must issue findings of fact and
conclusions of law on a motion for summary judgment is also demonstrably erroneous, as § 2579
of 9[C] is part of Chapter 7 of Wright & Miller's Federal Practice & Procedure, which chapter is
entitled "Trials," and has nothing to do with motions for summary judgment.7 Thus, Brighton
6

See Neves v. Wright, 638 P.2d 1195, 1197 (Utah 1981) and discussion thereof at Argument IX
and X in this Brief of Appellee.
7
For Wright & Miller's treatment of motions for summary judgment, see Chapter 8, in volume
9C. Furthermore, Brighton Title's citation to J. Pochynok Co. v. Smedsrud., (116 P.3d 353 (Utah
2005)) for the proposition that that the district court in the instant case was required to make
findings of fact or conclusions of law is inapt; J. Pochynok was a case that was tried, and to a
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Title's argument that the trial court "failed" to make any findings or provide its legal conclusions
is conclusively without merit as a matter of law.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a), Brighton
Title concedes in its Appellate Brief (page 46-47), that following the filing of Brighton Title's
motion for "clarification" of the court's original minute entry, in which the district court granted
summary judgment, "the Court entered another minute entry. (R 783-788)," (dated February 19,
2009) and that "[i]n this minute entry, the Court clarified its prior minute entry". On pages 4647 of its Appellate Brief Brighton Title quotes the district court's entire minute entry (consisting
of two, double-spaced pages (R 783-784)). Despite the district court's minute entry of February
19, 2009 constituting "a brief written statement of the ground for its decision (See Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a))," Brighton Title contends, "the trial court absolutely erred as a
matter of law in granting summary judgment without so much as a single stitch of legal
reasoning or analysis to support its decision (Appellate Brief, pages 47-48)," then further
contends, "But for the motion for clarification, neither this Court nor Brighton Title would have
had any idea the basis upon which the Court concluded judgment was appropriately granted to
Cooper." In such a contention lies the fatal flaw in Brighton Title's argument.
The court, in response to Brighton Title's motion for clarification of the district court's
first minute entry, provided yet another "brief written statement of the ground for its decision" in
compliance with Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a). Even Brighton Title acknowledges
in its Appellate Brief (page 48) that the district court's minute entries "consisted of both its
decision and subsequent explanation of that decision," yet Brighton Title contends that somehow

jury. J. Pochynok is a not a summary judgment case; thus, it was not governed by Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a) (which expressly excuses the district court from entering findings of
fact and conclusions of law in rulings on motions for summary judgment).
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the actions of the district court in clarifying and elaborating upon its decision with a second
minute entry (issued upon the request of Brighton Title, no less) constitute reversible error on the
part of the district court. Such contentions are facially without merit (See also Appellee's
Argument VII infra for further argument).
IV.

BRIGHTON TITLE OWED A FIDUCIARY DUTY TO COOPER.

Upon the performance of the condition or the happening of the event stipulated in the
escrow agreement, it is the duty of the depositary to deliver what is deposited in the
escrow, and the depositary, being as much the agent of the grantor as of the grantee, is as much
bound to deliver on the performance of the specified condition or the happening of the specified
event as he or she is bound to withhold until the performance or the happening of the event (See,
e.g., 28 Am. Jur. 2d Escrow § 28).
Brighton Title accepted the initial $100,000 earnest money from Deseret Sky in escrow, in
its capacity as an escrow agent for the transaction underlying the REPC. Brighton Title is
identified in the REPC as the escrow agent. At the expiration of the diligence period, if the
contract was not cancelled or objected to, Brighton Title was to forward the earnest money
to Metro National Title, and Cooper was to receive the earnest money. Brighton Title did
not forward the $100,000 in earnest money to Metro National Title, but instead disbursed
that $100,000 to Deseret Sky in default of Brighton Title's obligations to Cooper.
Utah Code § 7-22-108 provides for an escrow agent's duties as follows:
(2) All other assets or property received by an escrow agent in
accordance with an escrow agreement shall be maintained in a manner which will
reasonably preserve and protect the property from loss, theft, or damage, and
Paragraph 2 of Addendum No. 1 to the REPC provides, in pertinent part, "Earnest Money to be
$100,000 deposited w/ Brighton Title Company upon acceptance. An additional $100,000
earnest money to be deposited with Brighton Title Company after Buyer's Due Diligence
deadline." (R 280-289).
28

which will otherwise comply with all duties and responsibilities of a
fiduciary or bailee generally.
Brighton Title accepted the earnest money and agreed to serve as the escrow agent for the REPC
transaction. Brighton Title chose to act as it did. When there are conflicting claims to the fund
held by the escrow agent, the agent is neither required nor permitted to make its own
determination as to the rights of the rival claimants, but may rely upon any applicable contractual
provisions in refusing to deliver the documents to either party and cannot be held liable for
exercising its right to refuse delivery, or can seek a judicial determination by interpleader of the
entitlement of the parties. 28 Am. Jur. 2d Escrow § 28.
When the Diligence Period expired without objection or cancellation, Brighton Title had
three rightful options with respect to the disposition of the earnest money that it held on deposit.
First, hold the money pending an agreement between the parties to the REPC; second, to forward
the money on to Metro National Title, as required by the terms of the REPC; or third, interplead
the funds, as allowed by Rule 22, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Instead, Brighton Title chose a
fourth path of wrongfully returning the initial earnest money deposit to Deseret Sky. Brighton
Title is thus liable to Cooper for the amount of the initial deposit.
Brighton Title's liability is established by black letter law: "Title companies will be liable
for improper disbursement of funds they hold in escrow" (2 Title Insurance Law § 20:7. Title
companies' duties as escrow and closing agents—handling funds).
It is well established that an escrow agent assumes the role of the agent of both parties to
the transaction, and as such, a fiduciary is held to a high standard of care in dealing with its
principals.9 That Brighton Title is not a signatory to the REPC does not absolve Brighton Title
of its fiduciary, established legal duties as an escrow agent.
9

Freegard v. First Western Nat. Bank, 738 P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 1987) (citing National Bank v..
29

V.

BRIGHTON TITLE'S BREACH OF DUTY DAMAGED COOPER.

Brighton Title attempts to leverage further its invalid "not a party to the REPC" argument
to suggest that Cooper can make no claim to damages under the REPC. Not only does Cooper
have a clear-cut damages claim, such claim is as quintessentially clear-cut as a matter of law as it
can get, i.e., in the form of liquidated damages. As to liquidated damages, Brighton Title appears
to argue that Cooper cannot claim liquidated damages because Cooper's actual damages "are not
difficult to calculate," in light of "Cooper's calculation of the damages to the very last dollar."10
Oddly, Brighton's argument is that because Cooper's claimed damages indisputably exceed the
liquidated damages award provided in the REPC, Cooper is somehow barred from electing to
claim liquidated damages. As a matter of contractual right, Cooper was entitled to the earnest
money as liquidated damages upon its election following breach of the REPC.11 There is no

Equity Investors, 81 Wash.2d 886, 910, 506 P.2d 20, 35 (1973)"; see also Morris v. Clark, 100
Utah 252, 257, 112 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah 1941); cert deniedy314 U.S. 584, 62 S.Ct. 361, 86 L.Ed.
472 (1941); see also 28 Am. Jur. 2d Escrow § 26. Depositary is a fiducmry)). Deviation
from those terms without the mutual consent of the parties concerned will subject the agent to
liability for damages caused by his departure. Miller v. Craig, 558 P.2d 984 (Ariz. App. 1976).
10

The undisputed averment of the Affidavit of Robert T. Cooper, Jr. (filed with the court by
Plaintiff, Cooper Enterprises) states, on the subject of damages:
13. Thus, because Deseret Sky has defaulted in its obligations to purchase the
Real Property under the REPC, Cooper Enterprises has suffered actual losses of
$100,000.00 as forfeiture of Cooper Enterprises' earnest money under the Hansen
Contract, and $1,034,666.66 as loss of the gross profit Cooper Enterprises would
have realized as the difference in price between the Hansen Contract and the
REPC. (R 201)
11

A provision for liquidated damages is generally enforceable, the same as the other terms of a
contract, [unless] the damages thus stipulated are so excessive that they bear no reasonable
relationship to the actual damages suffered, [in which case] it would be unconscionable to give it
effect, [and] the court will regard it as a penalty and refuse to enforce it. Young Elec. Sign Co. v.
Vetas, 564 P.2d 758, 760 (Utah,1977); Foote v. Taylor, 635 P.2d 46, 49 (Utah,1981) (If a
provision in a contract provides for liquidated damages which are so grossly excessive in
comparison to actual damage suffered that it is unconscionable, the court will not enforce it.);
Andreasen v. Hansen, 335 P.2d 404, 407 (Utah,1959) (It is true that provisions for 'stipulated' or
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authority for the proposition that a plaintiff must forego liquidated damages when damages are
"easily calculated" after the fact and actual damages exceed the liquidated damages provision of
the breached contract.
Where the parties to a contract stipulate to the amount of liquidated damages that shall be
paid in case of a breach, such stipulation is, as a general rule, enforceable, if the amount
stipulated is not disproportionate to the damages actually sustained. Perkins v. Spencer, 243
P.2d 446, 449, 121 Utah 468, 243 P.2d 446 (Utah 1952) (citing Bramwell Inv. Co. v. Uggla, 81
Utah 85, 16 P.2d 913, 916 (Utah 1932)). In the instant case, the amount of forfeiture involved is
$200,000 on a contract of $7,500,000, from which Plaintiffs would have profited in the amount
of approximately $1,000,000. In fact, Cooper ended up losing not only its expected profit, but
forfeited to its Seller, W.H. Hansen, a $100,000 earnest money deposit of its own; thus the
liquidated damages are not greatly disproportionate to the actual damage and much less than
actually suffered by Cooper. See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Utah Dept. of Transp., 858 P.2d 1363,
1367 (Utah 1993).
VI.

UTAH INSURANCE DEPARTMENT BULLETINS DO NOT HAVE THE
FORCE OF LAW; THE REPC COMPLIED WITH LAW.

Contrary to the assertions of Brighton Title, Utah Insurance Department Bulletin 2007-1
patently does not have the force of law. Brighton Title contends that the REPC is a "transaction
deemed inappropriate and illegal by the Utah State Department of Insurance," (R 34) and that as

'liquidated' damages in cases of breach of contract have sometimes prescribed forfeiture of
amounts so grossly disproportionate to any actual damage that to enforce the provision would
shock the conscience. In such instances, the courts, invoking their powers of equity, refuse to
enforce such penalties. In that connection however, it is to be kept firmly in mind, that the courts
recognize the rights of parties freely to contract and are extremely reluctant to do anything which
will fail to give full recognition to such rights.); Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623, 625-626 (Utah,
1982) (Liquidated damages provisions are enforceable if designed to provide fair compensation
for a breach based on a reasonable relation to actual damages, (citing Young Elec. Sign Co. v.
Vetas, Utah, 564 P.2d 758, 760 (Utah 1977)).
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a consequence: "the contract is impossible to enforce based on the 'flip' transaction Plaintiffs
were attempting to transact;" (R 34) and "Brighton Title was prohibited by its underwriter
from participating in the transaction." (R 34) Brighton Title, however, points to no statute or
administrative rule that deems the REPC unenforceable as illegal, reason being that no such
statute or administrative rule exists.
Brighton Title cites to Utah State Department of Insurance "Bulletin 2007-1" to contend
that the REPC is an illegal transaction and thus unenforceable. The opinion of the Utah State
Department of Insurance, however, simply is not law, rule, nor administrative order, and is thus
not enforceable as law.12 Bulletin 2007-1, therefore, does not (it cannot) have the force of law;
the REPC does not constitute a violation of "law" that does not exist in the form of Bulletin
2007-1; and Bulletin 2007-1 does not relieve Brighton Title of its obligations as the escrow
holder. Notwithstanding the fact that Brighton Title cannot claim the REPC "violated" the nonlaw that is Bulletin 2007-1, Brighton Title nevertheless gratuitously concludes that Bulletin
2007-1 deems the transaction underlying the REPC a violation of Utah's good funds statute.
This argument, which derives from the erroneous premise that Bulletin 2007-1 is law, is thus
also patently erroneous. Brighton Title even concedes the point that nothing in the transaction
underlying the REPC violated Utah Code § 31A-23a-406.
Brighton Title's Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) witness, Jeffrey Gorringe, was
specifically examined concerning whether the transaction contemplated in this matter violated
any provision of the so-called good funds statute:

12

See Utah Code Title 31 A, Chapter 2, Administration of the Insurance Laws, and Utah Code
Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act (now appearing in Title 63G,
Chapter 3); to issue a mandatory and enforceable "rule" or an "order," an action by the Utah
Department of Insurance must comply with particular processes prescribed by statute. On its
face, it is clear that that Bulletin 2007-1 does not comply with these prescribed processes.
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Q. So, every one of those requirements [referring to Utah Code § 31A-23a406, "the good funds statute"] was met in this transaction. There's nothing in
this—these sections that prohibit this transaction. Right?
A. [Mr. Gorringe] Right.
* * *

Q. And Cooper then - within this section, could have simultaneously, upon
receipt of wired funds or cash, distributed that money to Hansen, to pay the
Hansen contract. Correct? It all could have been done the same day?
A. It all could have been done simultaneously.
Q. Is there anything that you see in the Code sections that are cited here [Utah
Code § 31 A-23a-406] . . . that would have been violated by the transaction we are
talking about here today?
A. No.
(Gorringe Depo., Pg. 68, line 25 to page 69, line 3; Pg. 70 lines 9 - 21 (R 467-468, 691-692)).
Brighton Title even acknowledges in its Appellate Brief that the district court "need not give
deference to the interpretative Bulletin [2007-1]" and cites the case of Nelson v. Betit 937 P.2d
1298, 130613, 316 Utah Adv. Rep. 31 (Utah App. 1997) in support of this rule.
Brighton Title clearly and repeatedly acknowledges and concedes both that the REPC did
not violate any law and that Brighton Title held the funds delivered to it in escrow. It is well
established that an escrow agent assumes the role of the agent of both parties to the transaction,
and such a fiduciary is held to a high standard of care in dealing with its principals.14 Deviation
from those terms without the mutual consent of the parties concerned will subject the agent to

Government agency interpretation is neither given "legislative effect" nor is it binding on the
courts because the interpretation at issue does not involve a regulation promulgated upon an
express delegation from Congress by formal rulemaking.
14

Freegard v. First Western Nat. Bank, 738 P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 1987) (citing National Bank v.
Equity Investors, 81 Wash.2d 886, 910, 506 P.2d 20, 35 (1973)8; see also Morris v. Clark 100
Utah 252, 257, 112 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah 1941); cert denied,314 U.S. 584, 62 S.Ct. 361, 86
L.Ed. 472 (1941); see also 28 Am. Jur. 2d Escrow § 26. Depositary is a fiduciary)).
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liability for damages caused by his departure. Miller v. Craig, 558 P.2d 984, 986, 27 Ariz.App.
789, 791 (Ariz. App.1976). 15
On May 31, 2007, Brighton Title knew that Cooper did not hold fee title to the Real
Property (Gorringe Depo., Pg. 17, lines 12-24 (R 268)). On June 1, 2007 (the next day),
Brighton Title informed Deseret Sky that Cooper did not hold fee title to the Real Property
(Gorringe Depo., Pg. 18, lines 10-12 (R 268)). With this knowledge, Brighton Title nevertheless
accepted the initial $100,000 earnest money from Deseret Sky in escrow, in its capacity as an
escrow agent.16 At the end of the Diligence Period, if the contract was not cancelled or objected
17

to, the earnest money was to be forwarded to Metro National Title. None of the earnest money
deposited with Brighton Title was ever forwarded to Metro National Title; instead, Brighton
Title released the funds back to Deseret Sky in default of its obligations to Cooper. Such plainly
does not constitute the law-abiding exercise of fiduciary duty on the part of an escrow agent.
Brighton Title claims that it "was faced with an express Department of Insurance Bulletin
which said the proposed transaction violated Utah law," and concludes that it "could do nothing
but withdraw from the transaction and refund the money to its depositor, Deseret Sky
15

See also 28 Am. Jur. 2d Escrow § 46. Actions at law; election of remedies:
In addition to equitable remedies, actions at law are maintainable for money
damages against the depositary when he or she fails to comply with the
agreement or breaches his or her duties thereunder, as by refusing to deliver the
escrowed item as required by the agreement. Id.

16

30A C J.S. Escrows § 18. Liabilities. A depositary is liable for a breach of the duties assumed
by him or her under the terms of the escrow contract. If the depositary deviates from the terms
of the escrow agreement without the mutual consent of the parties concerned, violates
duties assumed under the terms of the escrow contract or instructions, or breaches fiduciary
duties the depositary is liable in damages for the loss suffered thereby.
17

Plaintiffs Undisputed Facts, Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, (R
233 and 236).

34

Development." (Appellant Brief, page 28) Nothing could be farther from the truth, and Brighton
Title's equivocations belie its contentions.
Opinion, which is not law, intrinsically does not have the force of law in a court of law.
Yet Brighton Title's claims—on the one hand—that failure to comply with Bulletin 2007-1 risks
sanction by the Utah Insurance Department (not a court of law), but on the other hand concedes
that Bulletin 2007-1 does not have the force of law. It is Brighton Title that violated the law
governing escrow holders by failing to uphold its statutory fiduciary duty by choosing an extracontractual, illegal course of action19 and by failing to choose from three rightful options with
respect to the disposition of the earnest money that it held on deposit (i.e., hold the money
pending an agreement between the parties to the REPC, forward the money on to Metro National
Title, as required by the terms of the REPC, or interplead the funds, as allowed by Rule 22, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure). Instead, Brighton Title chose a fourth path of wrongfully returning

See Utah Code § 7-22-108, which provides for an escrow agent's duties as follows:
(2) All other assets or property received by an escrow agent in accordance with an
escrow agreement shall be maintained in a manner which will reasonably preserve
and protect the property from loss, theft, or damage, and which will otherwise
comply with all duties and responsibilities of a fiduciary or bailee generally.
19

When there are conflicting claims to the fund held by the escrow agent, the agent is neither
required nor permitted to make its own determination as to the rights of the rival claimants, but
may rely upon any applicable contractual provisions in refusing to deliver the documents to
either party and cannot be held liable for exercising its right to refuse delivery, or can seek a
judicial determination by interpleader of the entitlement of the parties. 28 Am. Jur. 2d Escrow
§28.
It must be borne in mind that Brighton Title accepted escrow after it became aware that
Cooper was not in title: On May 31, 2007, Brighton Title knew that Cooper Enterprises did not
hold fee title to the Real Property (Deposition of Jeffrey Gorringe, Pg. 17, lines 12-24 (R 268)).
On June 1, 2007 (the next day), Brighton Title informed Deseret Sky that Cooper Enterprises did
not hold fee title to the Real Property (Gorringe Depo., Pg. 18, lines 10-12 (R 268)).
Notwithstanding this knowledge, Brighton Title accepted the initial $100,000 earnest money
from Deseret Sky in escrow, in its capacity as an escrow agent.
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the initial earnest money deposit to Deseret Sky. Brighton Title is thus liable to Cooper for the
amount of the initial deposit of $100,000.00. Brighton Title's liability is established by black
letter law: "Title companies will be liable for improper disbursement of funds they hold in
escrow" (2 Title Insurance Law 20:7. Title companies' duties as escrow and closing
agents—handling funds).
Both undisputed fact and well-established Utah law conclusively refute Brighton Title's
"split escrow" argument. Brighton Title's contention that the transaction contemplated by the
REPC was illegal and thus void rests on the demonstrably erroneous argument that the REPC
violated "the law" as stated in a Utah State Department of Insurance Bulletin 2007-1 and Bulletin
2007-5. There is no legal basis for Brighton Title's claim. Brighton Title fails to articulate how
the REPC ostensibly violates the underlying statute which Bulletin 2007-1 or Bulletin 2007-5
attempts to interpret21 (i.e., Utah Code § 31A-23a-406(l)).22 The REPC is indisputably a legal
transaction as to Brighton Title. Brighton's "split escrow" argument that cites to § 31A-23a406(1) and Bulletin 2007-5 is but another of many red herrings Brighton Title has thrown in the
21

To issue a mandatory or enforceable "rule"—which neither Bulletin 2007-1 nor Bulletin 20075 are—the Utah Department of Insurance must comply with particular processes prescribed by
statute (see, generally, Utah Code §§31A-2-101, et seq. and Utah Code §§63-46a-l, et seq.
(renumbered by Laws 2008 and now appearing at Utah Code §§63G-3-101, et seq.).

Even Brighton Title itself stops short of claiming that Bulletin 2007-1 (and by the same
rationale, Bulletin 2007-5) has the force of laws when it correctly states:
"Admittedly, the Bulletin [2007-1] is interpretative and therefore this Court need
not give deference to the interpretation set forth in Bulletin 2007-1;"6
and
"Bulletins do not have the force of law and cannot be violated per se."
(See Paragraph 6, Affidavit of Richard Peter Stevens, former Assistant Commissioner of the
Utah Department of Insurance (Exhibit "H" to Brighton Title's Memorandum)
22

For the full text of Subsection (1) of Utah Code § 31 A-23a-406, which is the subject of
Bulletin 2007-1, See the first two pages of the Addendum to Brief of Appellee.
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path of an otherwise straightforward analysis. Contrary to Brighton Title's gratuitous claims that
"Cooper elected the transaction close as a 'split closing'" (Appellant Brief, page 29), the record
contains no such fact. The REPC itself does not identify the transaction underlying the REPC as
a "split closing," and in response to the following question (posed to Brighton Title's Jeffrey
Gorringe in his deposition (Gorringe Deposition, Pg. 25, lines 5-10 (R 270)):
Q: I just want to make clear. So when you received the money, you received
the contract, you understood that you would be holding that money in escrow to
fulfill the obligations contained in this contract, Deposition Exhibit 3 [the REPC].
Correct?
Mr. Gorringe replied:
A. Yes.
Brighton Title clearly understood that it, in agreement with the parties to the transaction, held
money in escrow to fulfill certain obligations under the REPC. Mr. Gorringe further stated in his
deposition:
•

that he understood that additional earnest money was to be deposited under the terms of the
REPC under certain conditions (Gorringe Deposition, Pg. 25 (R 270));

•

that those conditions were that if the contract had not been canceled or objected to within the
diligence period that another $100,000 was due (Id.);

•

that under the contract Brighton Title was to forward the earnest money deposits to Metro
National Title if the contract was not cancelled or objected to by the buyer after expiration
of the REPC's diligence period (Id.); and

•

that none of the earnest money deposit was ever forwarded to Metro National Title (Id.).
Brighton Title had a contractual and fiduciary duty to both parties when—and because—it
willingly and knowingly accepted and acted in its capacity as escrow agent. It did not have
the option, much less the "legal obligation," to violate its contractual duties; instead, it
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should have held the funds pending an agreement between the parties, interpleaded the
escrowed funds or complied with the contractual terms that governed it. Consequently, in
view of the undisputed facts surrounding Brighton Title's involvement in the transaction,
Brighton Title's liability is established by black letter law: "Title companies will be liable
for improper disbursement of funds they hold in escrow" (2 Title Insurance Law § 20:7.
Title companies' duties as escrow and closing agents—handling funds).
It is well established that an escrow agent assumes the role of the agent of both
parties to the transaction, and as such, a fiduciary is held to a high standard of care
in dealing with its principals.
Freegard v. First Western Nat. Bank, 738 P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 1987) (citing National Bank v.
Equity Investors, 81 Wash.2d 886, 910, 506 P.2d 20, 35 (1973)23; see also Morris v. Clark, 112
P.2d 153, 155 (Utah 1941), 100 Utah 252, 257; cert. denied,3\4 U.S. 584, 62 S.Ct. 361, 86 L.Ed.
472 (1941); see also 28 Am. Jur. 2d Escrow § 26. Depositary is a fiduciary)). Deviation from

23

See Schoepe v. Zions First National Bank, 750 F.Supp. 1084, at 1086-87 and n.4 (D. Utah
1990), where it discussed "Utah Case Law on Escrow Agency":

In reversing the trial court in Freegard v. First Western Nat'l Bank, 738 P.2d 614 (Utah 1987),
the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the complaint adequately stated a cause of action against
the escrow agent based upon the fiduciary duty the agent owed to its principal. In so holding,
the Utah Supreme Court cited with approval National Bank v. Equity Investors, 81 Wash.2d 886,
910, 506 P.2d 20, 35 (1973). National Bank held that an escrow agent's duties are defined by the
escrow instructions and that the agent becomes liable to its principals for damage resulting from
breach of the instructions or from exceeding authority conferred by the instructions. See 506
P.2dat35:
An escrow holder is an agent. Whether he be designated escrow agent or escrow
holder, or both, makes little difference in law; the important thing is that as an
agent, holder, or trustee for the parties, he occupies a fiduciary relationship to all
parties to the escrow. As an agent, trustee or holder, the escrow holder owes a
fiduciary duty to his principals in the same way that all agents are held to such
standards.
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those terms without the mutual consent of the parties concern ;• '
for damages ca
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Craig, 558 P.2d at 986 (Ariz. App. 1976).24

THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ENTERING THE RULING PREPARED
BY AND SUBMITTED TO THE COURT BY COOPER.
Having unpersuasively argued that the district coi••

*

..••.!• -J • \ provide a brief

written statenv»' •< f the gi uunci lor its decision in the form, of its two minute entries, Brighton
Title argues paradoxically that the district coir "^ * c*• • * -:

- ;ug. * _t-page> "Ruling on

Plain: iT^- Mo:i :. •-•:• >aniniar\ Judgment and Defendant Brighton Title Compare' <. W.iion i-:Summary Judgment" (R 804-828) constituted an abuse oi'ihe district court's discretion (See
App-J- .:k i v n e u pugC - m l .

Without any substantive explanation, Brighton I ltle gratuitously contends that the district
court's adoption of Cooper's proposed "Ruling on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and
Defendant Bright

'i* :

ri\;/ ; . .\louon for Summary Judgment" constitutes an abuse of

discretion. Such arguments, in the face of Brighton's i:

:

rr:-

t /ic a^inci court did "too

little" t« * articulate it; summary judgment decision, are both equivocal and, in their own right,
without merit as well.

See also 28 Am. Jur. 2d Escrow > -K\ Actions at law; election of remedies:
In addition to equitable remedies, actions at law are maintainable for money
damages against the depositary when he or she fails to comply with the agreement
or breaches his or her duties thereunder, as by refusing to deliver the escrowed
item as required by the agreement, Id.
30A C.J.S. Escrows § 18. Liabilities. A depositary is liable for a breach of the duties assumed by
him or her under the terms of the escrow contract. If the depositary deviates from the terms of
the escrow agreement without the mutual consent of the parties concerned, violates duties
assumed under the terms of the escrow contract or instructions, or breaches fiduciary duties the
depositary is liable in damages for the loss suffered thereby.
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Despite the district court issuing its twenty-four-page Ruling on Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment and Defendant Brighton Title Company's Motion for Summary Judgment,
Brighton Title contends that the district court erred "in both failing to provide sufficient legal
analysis and reasoning to support its decision" (See Appellate Brief, page 50-51) and "in
approving and executing a ruling which was submitted without leave of the Court and was not in
conformity with the Court's express decision." (Id.) Brighton Title cites to no authority for these
patently contradictory arguments. There is no law or rule that bars Cooper from submitting a
proposed order that the district court accepts and adopts as its own. Neither is there a law or rule
that puts a page limit on a district court's rulings. Brighton Title cannot complain that the district
court did both too little and too much in issuing its ruling on Cooper's motion for summary
judgment.25
VIII. BRIGHTON TITLE HAS NO STAKE IN COOPER'S ATTORNEY FEE
CLAIM AGAINST DESERET SKY, AND THUS HAS NO BASIS FOR
CHALLENGING THE ATTORNEY FEE AWARD AGAINST DESERET
SKY.
The Ruling and judgment of the district court make no attorney fees award against
Brighton Title. While the district court utilized the term "standing" when ruling that Brighton
Title was barred from objecting to the court's award of attorney's fees to Cooper as against
Deseret Sky, nomenclature is not determinative of the matter. The principle upon which the
district court made its ruling is sound, i.e., Brighton Title is not a real party in interest as to
Cooper's attorney's fee claim against Deseret Sky.

25

"Although we may search the record in an attempt to reconstruct the trial court's reasoning, the
better and more reliable approach, particularly in a matter of this complexity, is for the trial court
to explain its decision in a written memorandum decision or order." Free Motion Fitness, Inc. v.
Wells Fargo Bank West, NA, 208 P.3d 1066, n.6 (Utah Ct App. 2009), 629 Utah Adv. Rep. 3,
2009 UTApp 120.
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"[T]he 'real party in interest' is the party who,faythe substantive law, poss:s-.e-;
the right sought to be enforced, and not necessarily the person who will
ultimately benefit [or suffer, as the case may be] from the recovery
'*'
(Charles Alan Wright, The Law of Federal Courts § 70, at 490 & 11 ? ('5th ed 10Q41)
Brighton Title does not explain how —by virtue merely of being one defendant among two—it
acquired a stake in the dispute over a claim b -:/; *n* ' •: ;-\ .*? <>\. * ^\ < .. : ^ ajain^ , deseret
Sky. "In essence, the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court
decide the merits of the disr»m-' —-; <r •-*• -• J • - i^-ue.

I • i . Company, Inc. v. Jenkins,

P.3d — (2009), f 11 (Utah U. Apr. 2009); 2009 UtApr ! Q5 iciting Provo City Corp. v,
Thompson, ?004 1 'T 14. T lK N(> I1" H) 73 V. Brighton ; uk- vices nc-i even attempt to articulate, in
its .appeal argument, what cognizable interest it has in opposing the award of attorney's fees
against Deseret Nk v, ! lie district court issued no attorney fees award against Brighton Title.
Brighton Title has no interest in, reason for, or right to object 1* - an ;i\v;ird o! attorney lees not
made against Brighton 'I itle. The district court awarded attorney fees only as against Deseret
Sky Development, and Deseret Sky Dew i *

-\. .;•;

.. >

*•' i.jgmem anw. Ruling

submitted to the Court, without objection.
Rule 17(^a; r'!:•

' -v > "'*..-•** \

' ^ \UTJ p:v\ jue.i tn^ h'|e|very action shall be

prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest."26 Cooper sought an award of attorney's fees
against Desc~>: v

•.. . < <•: •

^ : :;

.

,: . sued w^erei Sky. Cooper did not sue
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Brighton Title for an award of attorney's fees.

Accordingly. Cooper sur-*-n^ (hat K ulc 1" can

Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) defines real party in interest as "A person entitled under
the substantive law to enforce the right sued upon and who generally, but not necessarily,
benefits from the action's final outcome.
97

The purpose of Rule 17(a) is to allow the defendant to a cause of action the right to have that
cause of action prosecuted by the real party in interest so that the judgment will preclude any
action on the same demand by another (See Green v. Louder, 29 P.3d 638, (Utah 2001)) and to
permit that defendant to assert all defenses or counterclaims available against real owner of the
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and must be construed to mean that Deseret Sky and only Deseret Sky can defend itself against
Cooper's claim for attorney fees. Brighton Title cannot be permitted to defend a claim made
solely against Deseret Sky. Given that Brighton Title is not a real party in interest to the question
of the award of attorney's fees to Cooper, the appeals court need not reach the question of
whether the district court award of attorney's fees is erroneous.28 Because Brighton Title presents
no evidence that it has a legally protectable interest in asserting Deseret Sky's potential defenses,
the district court did not err in determining that Brighton Title lacks standing to appeal award of
the attorney's fees against Deseret Sky. D.U, Co., Inc. v. Jenkins, — P.3d —-, \ 12 (Utah App.
2009) 2009 UTApp 195.
IX.

COOPER'S REPRESENTATION THAT IT HELD FEE TITLE TO THE
PROPERTY THAT WAS THE SUBJECT OF THE REPC WAS NOT A
BREACH OF THE REPC.

Brighton Title contends on appeal that Cooper misrepresented itself as the owner of the
Real Property because Cooper did not hold legal title when the parties entered into the REPC.
Defendant's contention is demonstrably erroneous. Even if any of Cooper's disclosures
somehow constitute misrepresentations, Brighton Title cannot claim such as a defense to its
breach of contract, nor claim breach of contract on the part of Cooper.
[I]f the party to whom a misrepresentation has been made, after having
ascertained the real facts of the case, and thus discovered the untruth of the
statements, goes on acting in pursuance of the contract,... he thereby waives the
benefit of the misrepresentations, and cannot allege them as a ground either for
rescinding or resisting enforcement of the agreement. In other words, the party
who has been misled is required, as soon as he learns the truth and discovers the
falsity of the statements on which he relied, with all reasonable diligence to
disaffirm the contract, and give the other party an opportunity of rescinding it, and
of restoring both of them to their original position. The party deceived is not

cause. fShurtleff v. Jay Tuft and Co.. 1980, 622 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1980)).
28

Notwithstanding, Cooper complied with Rule 73, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and case law
governing attorney's fee awards (See Affidavit of Attorney's fees and Costs (R 751-761)).
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allowed to go on deriving all possible benefit from the transaction, and then cL:: •
to be relieved from his own obligations by a rescission or a refusal to execute.
Le Vine v. Whitehouse. 109 !' 2. \ 3" I Itah Ml (Utah I"l0).
Accordingly, Brighton Title's defense, based upon Cooper's lack of title and/or Cooper's
ostensible misivpivsentmion i«; \\ iihmn merit as a matter of law. By the same token, the Le Vine
v. Whitehouse holding (and the Kenny v. Rich holding cited infra) dictates that IVIendant1a: • >>; asseri a_. .^

^.^vr.; jiam. \c: r.reaL'ii of contract that Deseret Sky itself had, by its

inaction, waived.
..'vspiu

ID;IJ:;JU»I!

: itle: 1) having known, on May 31, 2007, that Cooper's interest in the

property was not fee title (Gorringe I >:'->•

','

/.^ - : . -* • iv -<s • K a:u. J!• saving informed

Deseret Sky the next day (June 1. 2007) that Cooper did not hold fee title to the Real Property
(Gorringe Depo.. T'<' "s

n. • •

;; ;>• >; briLin:,).: • i. C nevertheless accepted the initial

$100,000 earnest money from Deseret Sky in escrow, and did so in its capacity as an escrow
agent.
Deseret Sky neither: 1) canceled the REPC by "r ^ *^< •

•*•*»~n • • * -. .,; nor

2 • a.-:'. t."\*.. .: ^ * J:-, objection ir- .v>v.-i,er regarding the Buyer's Due Diligence by the June 8,
2007 Due Diligence Deadline. Paragraph K

. i-

?

•.-..•:•;•

-iv consequence of

i !c^civ: :^K) s maLiiv.n:
8.3 Failure to Respond. If by the expiration of the Due Diligence Deadline, Buyer
does not: (a) cancel this Contract as provided in Section 8.2; or (b) deliver a
written objection to Seller regarding the Buyer's Due Diligence, The Buyer's Due
Diligence shall be deemed approved by Buyer; and the contingencies referenced
in Sections 8(a) through 8(g), including but not limited to, any financing
contingency, shall be deemed waived by Buyer,
(Emphasis added.)
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The guiding legal principles with respect to Deseret Sky's failure to timely cancel or object were
recently discussed by the Utah Court of Appeals in Kenny v. Rich, 186 P.3d 989 (Utah App.
2008), 2008 UT App 209. The Court of Appeals stated:
Where a party is contractually bound to follow certain procedures and timeline in
order to invoke specified contractual rights, and the party fails to do so, the party
waives his or her rights. See Brinton v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 973 P.2d 956, 966
(Utah 1998) ("[T]he trial court correctly required [the party] to timely assert each
objection to purported . . . violations of the [contract], in compliance with his
contractually assumed duty, or relinquish them [as waived]."); see also PCM Inv.
Corp. v. Pinecrest Inv. Co., 34 P.3d 785 (Utah 2001) ("[Defendants] failure to
choose either option [as required by the contract] resulted in waiver of its
contractual right to select an option."); American Rural Cellular v. Systems
Commc'n Corp., 939 P.2d 185, 193 (Utah App. 1997).
A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. In re Estate of Flake, 71
P.3d 589, 599 (Utah 2003) (citing Interwest Const, v. Palmer, 886 P.2d 92, 98 (Utah App.1994).
"Waiver of a contractual right occurs when a party to a contract intentionally acts in a manner
inconsistent with its contractual rights." "[The relinquishment] must be distinctly made, although
it may be express or implied." Id The procedures set out for cancellation or objection set forth
in the REPC are clear and unequivocal. Deseret Sky had until June 8, 2007, to exercise its rights
to object and/or cancel the REPC. Having failed to do so, Deseret Sky relinquished and waived
its right to rescind the REPC. Deseret Sky—and by extension, Brighton Title—is barred from
belatedly claiming a claim of breach against Cooper. Because Deseret Sky did not timely cancel
or object to the transaction in accordance with the terms of the REPC, the earnest monies became
non-refundable and payable to Cooper as liquidated damages.
Deseret Sky—and by extension, Brighton Title—waived any defense based on a theory
of fraud or misrepresentation. Deseret Sky waived any right to rescind based on a theory of
fraud. As of the June 8, 2007 Due Diligence Deadline Deseret Sky had neither canceled the
REPC by providing written notice to Seller nor delivered a written objection to Seller regarding
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the Buyer's Due Diligence. Nevertheless, for more than a month and a haP' -.fi^- 'i

K"r_.e?%

Deadline, IJesei d Sky continued to communicate with Cooper in the hope it might still
consummate a sale of the Real Property. At no time during continued contact and discussions
did Deseret Sky either assert to Cooper that it was defrauded or that it claimed a right of
cancellation based upon any misrepresentation.
It is well settled by decisions from [the Utah Supreme Court] court that a person
claiming the right to rescind a contract because of misrepresentations or fraud,
must, after discovery of the fraud, announce his purpose [to rescind] and adhere to
it. Frailev v. McGarry, 211 P.2d 840, 844 (Utah 1949) (citing Tavlor v. Moore,
87 Utah 493, 51 P.2d 222 (Utah 1935)).
Brighton Title can aumot claim an ihc one hand that Deseret Sky was defrauded, yet also
claim.—having discovered the ostensible misrepresentation—that Deseret Sky coi lid continue
under sui i • cue 11 instances to pursue an interest in the REPC. If it considered itself defrauded,
Deseret Sky's right was to cancel or object. Desert c " ^^ S- " nc!*:r.*- ; }0e;vi S*:; -- :mc by
extension, Brighton Title—cannot now belatedly assert fraud or misrepresentation as a defense.
X.

COOPER DID NOT HAVE TO BE IN TITLE DURING THE
EXECUTORY PERIOD FOR THE REPC TO BE BINDING UPOfv HIE
OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN THE TRANSACTION.

Prior to Ihc parlies entering into Ihc RI IV, Cooper was under contract with W.H. Hansen
Investments, LC to purchase the Real Property and, therefore, held equitable title in ihc R cii
P'v:v:}

-.;^r., ». :

-

»c-ci c. ^i.; was on notice of this fact the day before the REPC was

fully executed (and well before June 8, 2007, which date was Deseret Skv'v " > c * Yi:-:ervce
Deadline).
Equitable title is, by definition, "atitle 1 hat indie,lies ,i bencfiual intcic^l in pniperh and
that eives i/ic hoiu- in. \ ight to acquire formal legal title." (Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed.
2004).) Cooper thus held equitable lillc In ihc piopcr1> at Ihc nine n entered into the REPC with
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Deseret Sky. Cooper correctly claimed—and represented itself as holding—an ownership
interest in the Real Property; moreover, Deseret Sky had actual notice of the nature of Cooper's
title before expiration of the Due Diligence Deadline.
This very issue was expressly addressed in the Utah Supreme Court case of Neves v.
Wright, 638 P.2d 1195 (Utah, 1981). The Neves court held (at Pg. 1197) that a seller under a
uniform real estate contract that represents itself as having title need not have marketable title
until final payment is made or tendered. The Neves court further observed, inter alia:
[As early as 1909, in Foxley v. Rich, 35 Utah 162, 99 P. 666 (Utah 1909) the
Utah Supreme Court] established the fundamental rule that a seller need not have
legal title during the entire executory period of a real estate contract,,
Neves v. Wright, 638 P.2d at 1197.
In Owens v. Neymeyer, 62 Utah 580, 221 P. 160 (Utah 1923), the seller, at the
time the contract was entered into, did not have legal title to the land. His cousin,
who had a claim against the land for $1,277.75 as part of the seller's purchase
price, held legal title. About the time an action was commenced by the buyer, the
seller's cousin conveyed legal title to the seller, enabling him to convey good title
prior to the time established in the contract. The Court held that the purchaser
was not entitled to rescission and recovery of the purchase price.
Id. at 1198 (citing Corporation Nine v. Taylor, 30 Utah 2d 47, 513 P.2d 417 (Utah 1973);
Woodard v. Allen. 1 Utah 2d 220, 265 P.2d 398 (1953))..
The court in Neves v. Wright continued:
This Court reiterated the basic principle in Leavitt v. Blohm, 11 Utah 2d 220,
223, 357 P.2d 190, 192-93 (1960):
[T]he vendor in a real estate contract is generally not obliged to
have foil and clear marketable title at all times during the
pendency of his contract of sale because, ordinarily, title need not
be conveyed until the final payment is made or tendered; and we
further agree that the purchaser cannot use a claimed deficiency
in title as an excuse for refusing to keep a commitment to
purchase property, as was attempted in the case of Woodard v.
Allen, (1 Utah 2d 220, 265 P.2d 398 (Utah 1953).) (Footnotes
omitted.)
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The Neves v. Wright court went on further to explain:
Ihe rule that a seller of real estate need not have title at all times during the
executory period of a contract, is not designed to favor sellers over buyers;
rather, the purpose is to enhance the alienability of real estate by providing
necessary flexibility in real estate transactions
The basic test in determining whether a buyer can rescind is whether the defect,
by its nature, is one that can be removed, as a practical matter, as distinguished
from defects which, by their nature, cannot be removed by the seller as a
practical matter. Davis v. Dean Vincent Inc., 255 Or. 233, 465 P.2d 702 (1970).
M a t 1199.
Deseret Sky was fully advised of Cooper's interest in the Real Property during the Diligence
Period and still did nul aain/ol < «i ohnvi as allowed b\ the RLIV. Deseret Sky was provided a
title commitment showing Cooper as purchaser, and also was given a co^

• 5>; : -:. v,e*i

Contract2Q v-' " •.•:.•=. ::;.. -/-..-vu^-:;..: A^ . diligence Period, Deseret Sky knew that title
would pass from W. H. Hansen to Cooper, and then to Deserr Sky.
CONCLUSION
Even with all undisputed facts anil inferences east in (he hylil most iavorable to Brighton
Title, i jiere is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Brighton Title's defenses are patently
contrary to plain, established h\\ and aie w \\\u nil mail Cooper was entitled to summary
judgment as a matter of law (Allred ex rel. Jensen v. Allred, 182 P.3d 337 (Utah 2008) (citing
Rule 56(c), Utah R (*\\ !"' I The district i ourt judgment must be affirmed.

On or about May 27, 2007, Angela Gowans received from Cooper Enterprises a conditional use
application, preliminary plat submittal which included all applications, title, and geotechnical
information, drawings and engineering information, along with the Cottonwood Heights
Preliminary Approval, Application Acceptance Letter, Fencing Proposal, Permit Report,
correspondence with Cottonwood Heights City, sellers disclosures, and minutes from the
Cottonwood Heights Improvement District pertaining to the Danish Heights project (R 231).
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STATEMENT OF NO ADDENDUM
No addendum is necessary under Rule 24 (a)(l 1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
DATED and signed this ^>*- day of July, 2009.
S.R.WANGSGARD, LC
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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